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Résumé  
With a view to addressing the non-truth-conditional meaning of 
discourse connectives from a cognitive perspective, relevance theorists 
have for long pursued the argument that the relevant expressions do not 
carry conceptual (≈denotational) meaning, but rather encode procedures, 
i.e. instructions which guide pragmatic inference by creating cognitive 
‘shortcuts’ that the hearer takes advantage of during utterance 
interpretation. At the same time, they assume that logical connectives are 
conceptual, rather than procedural encodings. In this paper, I explore the 
extent to which an analysis of logical connectives along procedural lines 
is viable, by offering a number of arguments which suggest that logical 
connectives can and should be studied on a par with discourse ones.  
Mots clés : logical connectives, logical operators, internalist semantics, 
relevance theory, procedural meaning 
 
1. Setting the scene 
One of the less-known facts about Grice’s ‘Logic and Conversation’ 
(1975) is that the motivation behind it was not strictly speaking to 
develop a theoretical framework for systematically studying 
inferential pragmatics. Even though this paper is famously considered 
to have pretty much given birth to this domain of enquiry, Grice’s 
original aim in laying out his theory of implicature was essentially to 
defend the formal description of logical ‘devices’ against informalist 
claims that it falls short of capturing the explicit meaning of their 
natural language counterparts. In the Gricean picture then, the 
common binary logical connectives ’and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ manage to 
sustain their logical, truth-tabular semantic content, but their use can 
give rise to generalized conversational implicatures, as the following 
examples show: 
(1) John woke up and got out of bed.  
                                                            
1 I am grateful to Jacques Moeschler and Joanna Blochowiak for their kind invitation to 
the 1st LogPrag Workshop that took place at Les Diablerets in June 2015, as well as to 
all the participants of the workshop for the numerous insightful and inspiring 
discussions. Joanna Blochowiak additionally deserves my deepest gratitude for her 
editorial advice, encouragement and inordinate patience. 




(2) I’ve probably left the keys at the office or in the car.  
(3) If you keep shouting, I’ll have to ask you to leave.  
It should be pretty obvious that in most – if not all – contexts of 
utterance, the presence of the logical connective in each of these 
sentences would communicate more than what the relevant logical 
connective logically encodes. In (1), John did not just wake up and get 
out of bed, but most probably did so in that order. Then, in (2), the 
keys must have been forgotten either at the office or in the car, since it 
is unimaginable that they can be in two places simultaneously. 
Finally, in (3), there is clearly a cause-effect relation between the two 
events described in the antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional, which is again communicated over and above the logical 
meaning of ‘if’.  
This analysis of the enriched meaning(s) that logical connectives 
tend to communicate in terms of generalized conversational 
implicature has, of course, not gone undisputed. Relevance theorists, 
for example, have pursued the argument that the pragmatic 
enrichment of and-conjunctions belongs to the explicit rather than the 
implicit side of communication (cf. Carston 2002). Still, if one leaves 
this debate to the side, it seems that there is general agreement among 
most theorists of linguistic semantics/pragmatics that ‘and’, ‘or’ and 
‘if’ directly inherit the semantics of the corresponding logical 
operators, &, ∨ and →, and that their semantic description is 
exhausted by the relevant truth tables.  
Even though I do not intend, in this short paper, to contest the 
truth tabular approach as a means of capturing the semantic content 
of logical connectives, I would like to question its adequacy as a way 
of identifying what the relevant terms actually encode in the mental 
lexicon – assuming of course that there is such a structure in human 
cognition. The distinction I have in mind in this regard is one between 
the semantic description of lexical meaning in theoretical terms and 
with reference to the external world, and the identification of a lexical 
item’s semantic import when it is uttered, i.e. the actual information 
that its use triggers in the mind of the language user. This distinction 
is squarely based on the cognitive outlook that several theories have 
adopted with respect to the study of linguistic meaning, with 
relevance theory (henceforth RT) being the most notable such theory 
in the area of pragmatics. And indeed, it seems to be in line with what 
relevance theorists also have in mind, since, as Carston notes, what is 
meant by ‘semantics’ on “the internalist, cognitive processing 
(performance) view” that RT embraces, “is a relation between bits of 
linguistic form and the cognitive information they encode, rather than 
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a relation between forms and entities in the external world” (1999, 
114). 
Against this background, the broader, underlying question that 
motivates the present discussion is: What does it practically mean for 
a lexical item to encode a truth table? Useful though it may be for the 
theoretical description of logical connectives, I believe that the truth-
tabular approach does not have any cognitive substance when it 
comes to the identification of what it is that the utterance of a logical 
connective triggers in the mind of the language user. I therefore wish 
to propose that the RT distinction between conceptual and procedural 
meaning, which Carston also alludes to in the citation above, can be 
highly informative in this respect. More specifically, my aim in this 
paper is to challenge the standard RT view that logical connectives are 
exclusively conceptual encodings, opening up the possibility of 
identifying a procedural component in their encoded meaning. To this 
end, I will start off my discussion by briefly presenting the 
conceptual/procedural distinction within RT, before turning to make 
a case for the analysis of logical connectives on a par with that of 
discourse ones.   
2. The conceptual/procedural distinction 
The RT notion of procedural meaning was first approximated by 
Blakemore (1987), in a treatise that reappraised the Gricean category 
of conventional implicature from a cognitive angle. For Grice, the 
category of conventional implicature comprised the conventional 
meaning of certain lexical items – typically discourse markers and 
connectives, such as ‘but’, ‘moreover’ or ‘therefore’ – which do not make 
a truth-conditional contribution to the proposition explicitly 
expressed by an utterance that contains them. The difference between 
this type of implicature and the aforementioned category of 
generalized conversational implicature is that conventional 
implicature is not defeasible and remains unaffected by contextual 
considerations altogether2. From an RT perspective, however, it is 
precisely because these particular meanings are not subservient to 
pragmatic enrichment processes, like all other kinds of implicature, 
that their classification as implicatures is a misnomer. In search of a 
psychologically plausible alternative, Blakemore reanalysed the 
encoded meaning of the relevant terms along procedural lines, by 
suggesting that their cognitive role is to impose semantic constraints 
on the derivation of pragmatic inferences. A procedure, in this 
                                                            
2 For example, the generalized conversational implicature communicated by (1) could 
easily be cancelled with just a small emphatic addition, as in “John woke up and got out of 
bed, but not in that order”.    




context, is an instruction that guides pragmatic inference by creating a 
cognitive ‘shortcut’ that the hearer takes advantage of during 
utterance interpretation. Take for example the use of the discourse 
connective ‘so’ in the following utterance: 
(4) So, Mary won’t go to the party.  
Even though the meaning of ‘so’ does not affect the truth 
conditions of the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance in 
(4), it still seems to provide the hearer with a directive to compute this 
proposition as a conclusion derivable from some readily available 
contextual assumption(s) – be it information in the previous discourse 
about Mary’s workload or alternative plans for the night, or just the 
mere realization that Mary is still watching TV in her pyjamas and 
does not look like she is willing to go out. 
In this picture, procedural encodings lie at the other end of the 
scale from conceptual ones, which comprise the representational/ 
denotational meaning typically attributed to open-class words, like 
‘tree’, ‘run’ or ‘dog’. As Wilson acknowledges, “although concepts and 
procedures themselves are not part of the linguistic system proper, the 
relation between a word and the concept or procedure it encodes is 
properly regarded as semantic” (2011, 10), since, from a psychological 
perspective, it has to do with the kind of cognitive information that 
the word at hand encodes. So, in RT, while the use of the word ‘dog’ in 
an utterance triggers the concept DOG, which will then be included, 
either in its current or in some pragmatically enriched form, in the 
explicitly expressed proposition it forms part of, using a word like ‘so’ 
or ‘but’ triggers an instruction of the type ‘do X with proposition p’ or 
‘treat proposition p as Y’. 
Despite the originally perceived one-to-one correspondence 
between procedural encodings and conventional implicatures, further 
research within RT has revealed that the distinction between concepts 
and procedures is no longer co-extensive with that between truth-
conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning, which in the first 
place motivated the Gricean postulation of conventional implicature. 
In this respect, relevance theorists have used the notion of procedural 
meaning as a means of describing the encoded content of not only 
further truth-conditionally irrelevant linguistic devices, but also of 
truth-conditional ones, such as tense and pronominal expressions.  
3. The case for a procedural analysis of logical connectives  
Given the presentation of the RT distinction between concepts and 
procedures above, it seems natural at this point to wonder what it is 
that the logical connectives ’and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ encode. The standard 
answer that RT provides to this question is that they are conceptual 
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encodings, mainly because of their truth-functional nature. Even 
though this is the view that I wish to challenge in this short paper, I 
need to make a crucial clarification before I go on. My aim here is not 
to argue that the encoded content of the relevant terms is exclusively 
procedural rather than conceptual; it is actually far more modest than 
that. What I wish to do is provide some reasons that open up the 
possibility of approaching this encoded content in procedural terms, 
despite the rigid and, to my mind, unjustified conviction that logical 
connectives have a special position in the mental lexicon just because 
their logical counterparts have a special position in truth calculi. It 
may very well be that further scrutiny reveals that logical connectives 
encode both conceptual and procedural information, but as I will 
attempt to show in what follows, there is hardly any reason to a priori 
dismiss their analysis along procedural lines, and quite a few ones to 
seriously consider such an analysis on a par with the one reserved for 
discourse connectives in RT.  
3.1. The special status of logical connectives 
As I have already mentioned above, one of the main reasons for 
considering logical connectives special is that the corresponding 
logical operators also have a, pretty much undisputed, prominent role 
in logic. The argument that I wish to pursue in this section is that 
there is no guarantee that this very same role should be inherited in 
the description of natural language, which has after all always been 
considered “imperfect” from the logician’s point of view.  
Even a quick look at an introductory textbook on Logic in 
Linguistics (Allwood & al 1977) seems to corroborate this point. As 
Allwood, Andersson and Dahl discuss, there are two reasons why 
logical analysis has concentrated only on ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’, despite the 
presence of many more connectives in natural language. The first one 
is that “logic has been studied primarily for its mathematical interest, 
which has led to a concentration on those types of inference which are 
common in mathematical reasoning” (1977, 27); hardly a reason for a 
priori excluding other connectives from the logical analysis of natural 
language (insofar as they can be shown to be of relevance to it). The 
second one, i.e. “the extent to which the connectives of natural 
language are truth-functional” (ibid.) is also, obviously, the more 
serious too. Even though this is a point that I will return to discuss in 
more detail later on (cf. section 3.3.3.), it could still be argued, even if 
somewhat superficially, that ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ are not the only natural 
language connectives that are truth-functional. Despite its well-
attested difference in meaning from ‘and’, ‘but’ is also strictly speaking 
truth-functional, since knowing the truth values of the conjuncts that 




it connects, is sufficient for calculating the truth value of the full 
propositional compound.  
But even if we are to leave the, admittedly debatable, 
characterisation of ‘but’ as truth-functional to the side, the one-to-one 
correspondence between logical operators and their linguistic 
counterparts has also been challenged in the light of cross-linguistic 
data (cf. Mauri 2008; Mauri & van der Auwera 2012). For one, it is not 
just the case that the distinction between inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction is not encoded in any natural language, but there also 
seem to be languages that lack a connective meaning ‘or’ altogether3, 
or even a connective meaning ‘and’4. Then, several languages also 
seem to have dedicated connectives that underlie semantic 
distinctions which are not identified within logic. For example, the 
SerboCroatian ‘pa’ (=and then) encodes sequential conjunction (Mauri 
2008, 90), while the Tukang Besi ‘kene’ (=and at the same time) 
encodes non-sequential conjunction (Mauri 2008, 94).  
Clearly, this representative set of examples does not show 
anything extraordinary. It just reinforces the observation that, 
although logic can be usefully implemented in the description of 
natural language (and perhaps vice versa too), natural language and 
logic are inherently different. This much should not be surprising, if 
one considers that 
« it is systems of thought, rather than linguistic systems, for which a truth 
calculus should be devised. If this is right, there is no obvious reason to 
suppose, or to consider it desirable, that what natural-language 
connectives and determiners encode is identical to the context-free, truth-
based properties of logical operators; rather, there is some reason to expect 
differences in at least some cases. » (Carston 2002, 257) 
3.2. The functional role of logical connectives 
My discussion has so far concentrated on establishing some grounds 
for questioning the assumption that logical connectives perfectly 
match logical operators, in an attempt to substantiate the claim that 
logical connectives might not necessarily have the special status that 
formal logical analysis reserves for the them. I will now try to further 
motivate this possibility by comparing them to discourse connectives, 
which are unambiguously treated as procedural encodings in RT. To 
this end, I will present in this section a recent argument, according to 
which, both logical and discourse connectives ultimately have the 
same functional role to play in human cognition, before moving on, in 
                                                            
3 For example, Wari, a Chapacura Wanham language spoken in South America (Mauri 
2008, 167). 
4 For example, Maricopa, a Hokan Yuman language spoken in Arizona (Gil 1991) 
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the next one, to discuss how logical connectives fare in relation to the 
tests for procedurality that relevance theorists have come up with.  
One of the latest developments in RT is the postulation in the 
human cognitive system of “a capacity for ‘epistemic vigilance’, which 
helps hearers avoid being accidentally or intentionally misinformed” 
(Wilson 2014, 145; cf. also Sperber & al 2010), over and above the 
dedicated relevance-oriented capacity that enables them to 
pragmatically infer speaker-intended meaning. This proposal is of 
course based on the empirically-supported argument that the main 
function of our reasoning ability is “to devise and evaluate arguments 
in order to persuade” (Mercier & Sperber 2011, 57), rather than to 
discover truth, and therefore improve knowledge and enhance 
individual cognition, as it has been traditionally assumed. While this 
may seem irrelevant to the present discussion, in a recent paper 
revisiting the conceptual/procedural distinction, Wilson, following 
Sperber (2001), suggested that it opens up the possibility that “the use 
of (conceptual) logical connectives such as and, or and if . . .then and 
(procedural) discourse connectives such as but, so and after all may be 
more closely linked to the capacity for epistemic vigilance targeted at 
communicated contents than to pragmatics proper” (2011, 24). If this 
is correct, it would suggest that logical and discourse connectives are 
functionally equivalent, which could in turn mean that they have 
common characteristics, since they have both emerged in our 
vocabulary for the same purpose.  
3.3. RT tests for procedurality 
In the previous section, I noted that logical and discourse connectives 
could exhibit common characteristics due to their common function in 
cognition. There is of course a sense in which this is trivially true, 
since both type of expressions are higher-order predicables, which by 
definition take full propositions as arguments. Going beyond the 
formal description of both types of connectives, however, I think that 
they also share certain features in view of their semantics. In an 
attempt to identify these features, I will now turn to the three tests 
that, according to RT, reveal the “properties we can expect an 
expression which encodes procedural meaning to have” (Blakemore 
2002, 82). 
3.3.1. Accessibility to consciousness 
The description of word meaning has proven to be one of the 
thorniest challenges in semantic theory, with a number of 
philosophers and linguists alike debating about the most accurate 
way of approaching the matter. Even so, a native speaker of any 




language seems to be perfectly capable of paraphrasing or simply 
describing the meaning of any lexical item in her vocabulary, insofar 
as it has some denotational value, in the sense that it manages to pick 
out some entity or event in the external world. As Wilson and Sperber 
note, however, this is not the case with discourse connectives: 
« Discourse connectives are notoriously hard to pin down in conceptual 
terms. Conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness: 
procedures cannot. We have direct access neither to grammatical 
computations nor to the inferential computations used in 
comprehension.  »  (Wilson & Sperber 1993, 16) 
Clearly, the same could be argued to hold for logical connectives as 
well; that is, one would not normally expect anyone to be able to 
describe the meaning of ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’, with the same ease as s/he 
would explain the meaning of open-class words, such as ‘tree’ or ‘dog’. 
Some training in philosophy definitely seems to be necessary in order 
to provide an informed answer to some informal query about what a 
logical connective mean.  
3.3.2. Compositionality 
As anyone with even some minimal knowledge of semantics could 
assert, our ability to combine lexical meanings by positioning 
constituents in a particular order is one of the most fundamental traits 
of human language. It is after all the ability that gives human 
language its extraordinary expressive power, since it can account for 
the fact that we are capable of producing an infinity of meanings by 
creatively, yet systematically, manipulating finite linguistic means. 
With respect to conceptual encodings, for example, one can easily 
concatenate several of them in order to make a description more 
specific than it would otherwise be. So, while one might opt to refer to 
Nemo as just a ‘fish’, one could also be more precise by combining the 
concept FISH, with BEAUTIFUL, SMALL, RED and WHITE STRIPED.  
However, the situation is quite different when it comes to 
procedural encodings. As Blakemore notes, “one would not expect 
expressions which encoded procedures to combine to be a constituent 
of a complex expression” (2002, 84). This indeed seems to be the case 
with discourse connectives. Even though they do combine, they can 
only do so minimally (e.g. but still, but after all, etc.), and far less 
productively than conceptual expressions (cf. Rouchota 1998). The 
same, however, seems to also apply in the case of logical connectives. 
And even more interestingly, logical connectives do not just combine 
only minimally with each other (e.g. and if, or if), but also exhibit the 
exact same behaviour when combined with discourse connectives too 
(e.g. and so, but if). If anything, this is a further indication that both 
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logical and discourse connectives are functionally equivalent 
expressions.  
3.3.3. Truth-evaluability 
What I hope to have shown so far is that logical connectives are 
suspiciously similar to discourse connectives, as far as certain 
properties that RT views as pertaining predominantly to procedural 
information are concerned. In this respect, the only reason that could 
justify their ‘conceptual’ description in RT would be that, being truth-
functional, logical connectives seem to affect the truth conditions of 
the propositional compounds that they are part of. As Blakemore 
discusses, this is a final feature that can help distinguish between 
concepts and procedures: “an expression which encodes procedural 
information encodes information which is not a constituent of the 
conceptual representations over which inferential computations are 
performed” (2002, 82). On the basis of this feature then, logical 
connectives would fall under a conceptual characterisation, since they 
are by definition truth-functional. However, such a conclusion could 
still be contested.  
For one, the criterion of truth-evaluability seems to directly clash 
with the pronounced aim of RT in relation to the investigation of 
semantics in cognitive processing terms. As I already noted in the 
introductory section of this paper, quoting Carston (1999, 114), and as 
Blakemore also asserts, “the question that matters [for RT semantics] 
is not whether a linguistic expression contributes to something with 
truth conditions, but rather what kind of cognitive information an 
expression encodes” (2000, 464). Against this backdrop, it could be 
argued that the introduction of truth-evaluability as a defining factor 
for the classification of a lexical item in terms of the cognitive 
information it encodes trivialises the underlying distinction that 
relevance theorists draw between externalist and internalist semantics 
in the first place.  
Even so, let’s assume for a moment that this evident clash does not 
exist, and that the truth-conditional contribution of an expression does 
play a role in figuring out whether it encodes conceptual and/or 
procedural information. There is still a way in which it could be 
maintained that logical connectives do not fulfil the criterion of truth-
evaluability posed above. Since logical connectives do not affect the 
truth conditions of the individual propositions they conjoin, the 
encoded meaning of ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ could be characterised as a 
‘constituent of a conceptual representation’ only if it makes some 
truth-conditional contribution to the whole propositional compound 
in which it is included.  




To the best of my knowledge, this argument has been pursued 
within RT only in relation to and-conjunction, with evidence provided 
through the use of the operator-scope embedding test, as in the 
example that follows:  
(5) He didn’t get rich and get married; he got married and got rich.  
Given the traditional logical description of &, the order in which the 
two conjuncts (he got rich, he got married) appear in the two 
conjunctions in (5) should not have any effect on the truth conditions 
of either one of the two conjunct propositions that (5) encodes. If that 
were the case, the juxtaposition of these two complex propositions, 
with the first one being embedded in the scope of negation as it is, 
would patently result in a contradiction of the form ‘Not p; p’. 
However, the full statement in (5) is far from contradictory, which in 
turn suggests that the presence of ‘and’ does affect the truth conditions 
of a conjunct proposition that contains it.  
This discussion of and-conjunction seems to point towards the 
conclusion that, given the criterion of truth-evaluability, ‘and’ encodes 
conceptual information. However, looking into the RT research on 
conjunction, an alternative, cognitive-based explanation as to why 
‘and‘ exhibits this behaviour can be located. As Blakemore and 
Carston discuss in their latest paper on sentential coordination with 
‘and’, what justifies the effort involved in processing an and-
conjunction is that “the conjuncts function together as premises, 
whether conjoined or not, in the derivation of a cognitive effect” (2005, 
588), which, in RT terms, signifies a logical consequence that is 
brought about through the addition of the conjunct proposition as a 
whole to a hearer’s belief-system. In this respect, the apparent truth-
conditional contribution of ‘and’ to a conjunct proposition that 
contains it could be approached as a means of ensuring the derivation 
of some cognitive effect following a particular inferential route, rather 
than as a piece of evidence that ‘and’ encodes exclusively conceptual 
information.  
4. Concluding remarks 
As I have already noted, my present inquiry into the type of cognitive 
information that the lexical items ’and’, ‘or’ and ‘if’ encode stems from 
a genuine curiosity about the status of the relevant truth tables as 
actual psychological constructs that speakers and hearers employ 
when using these logical connectives in verbal communication. If, as I 
suspect, truth tables have no such cognitive substance, they are 
nothing more than tools for describing the semantic content of logical 
operators, and, perhaps, by extension logical connectives too, and we 
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had better start looking for alternative answers to the question of what 
it is that their use triggers in the mind of the language user.  
In this paper, I have suggested that a plausible such answer could 
lie in the RT notion of procedure meaning. And if the arguments I 
have offered above are on the right track, it should not be too 
extravagant to suppose that, much like discourse connectives, logical 
connectives are also primarily markers of ‘the inferential 
computations that are performed over conceptual representations’ 
rather than ‘constituents of these conceptual representations’ as such. 
If anything, such a conclusion would be consonant with the Tractarian 
analysis of logical constants as “operations” (Wittgenstein 1922, 60) 
that “do not represent” (Wittgenstein 1922, 42), and particularly 
fruitful in the context of discussing logic not just as a system of truths, 
but as a system that “allows us to represent all kinds of arguments 
and assess them from the point of view of their validity” (Fràpolli & 
Assimakopoulos 2012, 628).  
Naturally, a particularly pertinent question that still remains 
unanswered concerns the actual procedures that the logical 
connectives under question could be taken to encode in the alternative 
cognitive account that I have tried to motivate here. This is a question 
that deserves much more thought than I have been able to give it so 
far, but I think that I can already offer a couple of remarks, especially 
in relation to the procedures encoded by ‘and’ and ‘if … then’. In this 
respect, even though the aforementioned analysis of ‘and’ by 
Blakemore and Carston was not originally meant as an analysis along 
procedural lines, I believe that the answer to the question of what 
linguistic sentential conjunction encodes could actually lie in it. After 
all, an instruction of the type ‘look for a cognitive effect by taking both 
conjuncts as premises’ already seems to have a procedural flavour to 
it. Then, when it comes to ‘if … then’, I think that the overwhelming 
discomfort with the truth table for the material conditional, on the 
grounds that some of its predictions are completely counter-intuitive, 
provides enough reason to seriously consider the possibility that the 
procedure it encodes includes a link of some sort between the 
propositions expressed in a conditional’s protasis and apodosis (cf. 
van der Auwera 1986). 
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